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Introduction
Career patterns have changed in the post-industrial era. The
traditional model of lifetime employment with a single employer is
transforming to a model of serial employment with multiple
employers over the employee's career. At the same time, an ever-
increasing number of individuals are employed in positions where
they have access to confidential business information belonging to the
employer, or have ongoing, personal relationships with customers.
One way in which employers have responded to these changes is by
requiring employees in such positions to agree not to compete with
the employer for a period of time following the termination of the
employment relationship. This article addresses a recent backlash
that has occurred against such noncompete agreements in the
broadcasting industry.
Covenants not to compete with an employer after the
termination of an employment contract are widely used with
television newscasters and radio personalities. They are enforceable
in most states, as long as the restrictions they impose on the
employee's ability to work in the broadcasting industry are
reasonable in terms of geography, duration, and the range of activities
prohibited. In recent years, however, states have begun passing
legislation aimed specifically at prohibiting noncompetes in the
broadcasting industry, even where such contracts are enforceable in
other employment contexts.
I address those legislative prohibitions on the enforcement of
post-employment covenants not to compete in the broadcasting
industry. In the first two sections of the article, I discuss the common-
law doctrine of noncompetition agreements that gave rise to the
legislation, beginning with a general discussion of covenants not to
compete, and then discussing the application of that doctrine in the
context of the entertainment industry. In the third section, I discuss
the new legislative developments. In the fourth section, I discuss some
possible justifications for a legislative prohibition on the enforcement
of noncompetes in the broadcasting industry. Finally, I conclude that
the costs of a blanket prohibition on noncompetes in the broadcast
industry outweigh the benefits of such legislation, and that parties to
broadcasting employment contracts should be free to negotiate and to
enforce post-employment covenants not to compete in the same
manner as any other contract provision.
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I
Covenants Not to Compete Generally
A covenant not to compete is "[a]n agreement, generally part of
a contract of employment or a contract to sell a business, in which the
covenantor agrees for a specific period of time and within a particular
area to refrain from competition with the covenantee."' In the
employment context, noncompete agreements are commonly entered
with managerial, sales and technical employees who have access to
confidential business information or develop close relationships with
customers Such agreements are thought necessary to prevent
unscrupulous employees from appropriating confidential trade
information and customer relationships for their own benefit, so that
employers can invest optimally in research, employee training,
improvement of business methods, and client relationships without
fearing that their investments will be lost to competitors as soon as
they begin to bear fruit.' An employee who gains confidential
business information and then takes a job with a competitor leaves
the first employer, in the words of Judge Flaum, "in the position of a
coach, one of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the
opposing team before the big game."4
On the other hand, post-employment restraints on competition
are, by their very definition, anticompetitive. They prevent other
employers from bidding, in a free market, for the employee's services,
and thereby hinder the transfer of the employee's human capital to its
most highly valued use.' They prevent the employee from changing
employers to maximize his own personal utility.6 To the extent that
they prevent the flow of proprietary business information, they
impede dissemination of knowledge that could be used to increase
1. Black's Law Dictionary 329 (5th ed., West 1979).
2. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625,
626 (1960).
3. Id. at 627; cf. Wichita Clinic, P.A. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 45 F.
Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Kan. 1999) (holding that a covenant not to compete was valid where its
purpose was to protect clinic's initial investment in helping physicians establish their
practices); Ballesteros v. Johnson, 812 S.W.2d 217 (Mo. App. 1991) (holding that a
covenant not to compete was valid where employer had established practice for several
years prior to associating with cardiologist, and cardiologist had never been in private
practice and had no patient or referral base prior to association with employer).
4. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
"inevitable disclosure" doctrine).




Although the common law's treatment of restraints on the
alienation of human capital developed separately from its treatment
of restraints on the alienation of real property, both types of
restrictive covenants are in fact subsets of a broader category:
restraints on the alienation of entitlements.8 Restraints on the
alienation of entitlements are disfavored in the common law, whether
those entitlements are interests in real property,9 goods, services, or
human capital. l Regardless of the type of entitlement, transferability
is thought to be necessary to promote the efficient use of
entitlements."
7. See Blake, supra n. 2, at 627. Of course many areas of the law recognize that
minor anticompetitive effects are a necessary cost of encouraging individuals and firms to
design better mousetraps. Indeed, the entire concept of protecting intellectual property -
whether it is by copyright, patent, trademark, or otherwise - is premised on such a notion.
8. For a general discussion of the concept of entitlements, consult Guido Calabresi
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
9. See Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Coke 40a, 41b, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 315 (1606)
(Coke, J.) (holding that a restraint on alienation is repugnant to power characteristic of fee
simple estates).
10. See The Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. 5, 5 Mich. 26 (1414) (holding that a covenant
not to compete for six months following termination of employment unenforceable on the
ground that it constituted an improper restraint of trade).
11. With regard to real property, at least four justifications are generally given for
the policy underlying free alienation: (1) if some property is removed from the market
through restraints on alienation, the artificially reduced supply will cause an increase in
the market price of property that is available on the market, thereby keeping prices above
a normal equilibrium level; (2) restraints tend to perpetuate the concentration of wealth
because owners cannot sell the property and consume the proceeds; (3) restraints
discourage improvements by the possessor who is unable to market the improved land,
which prevents the land being put to its highest valued uses; and (4) restraints are a
hardship on creditors who lend money in reliance on being able to reach the debtors'
property in the event of default. See 6 American Law of Property § 26.3 (1952). The first
and third justifications are efficiency arguments. An additional, closely related, argument
holds that restraints on alienation remove a certain amount of the national capital from
trade. Herbert A. Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on
Alienation, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 1158, 1180 (1959). The second justification, as Professor
Robinson points out, is probably wrong, as illustrated by the expression "land poor." Glen
0. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of "Obsolete" Covenants, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 546, 568 n. 81 (1991). The second justification has sometimes been
couched in terms of restraints on alienation leading to "survival of the least fit." See
Bernhard, supra n. 11, at 1180. Again, it is difficult to see how a restraint that that prevents
the owner of property from transferring it to higher-valued uses can reasonably be
described as increasing the owner's wealth. The fourth justification is unrealistic, since no
sensible creditor would lend money on the basis of a nontransferable security interest. As
an additional justification for the policy favoring alienation, it has sometimes been said
that where the restrictive covenant has been imposed in a death conveyance, there are
public policy concerns about dead-hand control. Id. Those concerns, of course, are
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In the context of a freely negotiated covenant not to compete,
however, the fact that the covenant exists is evidence that the parties
to the contract believed the gains achieved from restricting
competition in the context contemplated by the contract outweighed
the costs associated with that restriction. The question then becomes
whether, and to what extent, courts and/or legislatures should
intervene to promote the alienability of entitlements over the
objection of parties who have sought to restrain such alienability. 2 If
it is determined that noncompetition agreements should be enforced,
a question of remedy arises: should such agreements be specifically
enforced by injunction, or are damages an adequate remedy for the
violation of a covenant not to compete?
As to the first question, on the enforcement of covenants not to
compete, most jurisdictions in the United States follow the rule set
forth in the Restatement of Contracts that:
(1) A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a
restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid
transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of
trade if
(b) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the
promisee's legitimate interest, or
(a) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to
the promisor and the likely injury to the public.
(2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid
transaction or relationship include the following:
(b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to
compete with his employer or other principal."
Thus, a post-employment covenant not to compete will generally
be enforceable as long as the restraint is no greater than is necessary
14 thto protect the employer's legitimate interest, and the employer's
irrelevant to post-employment covenants not to compete.
Applying those arguments to the employment context, we can see that the following
justifications for the policy favoring free alienability of real property also justify a policy
favoring free alienability of human capital: (1) an artificial reduction in the supply of
employees available on the market drives up the cost to other employers of employees
who are not subject to noncompetes; (2) employees who are the subject of restraints will
be discouraged from developing human capital, since they cannot market their skills to the
highest bidder; and (3) noncompete agreements remove a certain number of employees
from the market.
12. See Robinson, supra n. 11, at 568.
13. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981).
14. Courts generally find the employer to have a legitimate interest where
need for the restraint is not outweighed by hardship to the employee
and the likely injury to the public. To make this determination, courts
consider such factors as the reasonableness of the covenant's
geographic scope, duration, and the range of activities it prohibits."
The determination whether to enforce such an agreement is
made on a case-by-case basis, and courts' conclusions as to what
constitute a "reasonable" restraint varies widely. Territorial
restrictions will generally not be enforced outside the employer's
business area, 6 and even territorial restrictions within the employer's
business area may be held unreasonable to the extent that they cover
regions where the employee did not personally do business. 17 A
territorial restriction that includes only the employer's normal market
area will generally be enforced. 8
Temporal restrictions likewise receive varying treatment. Some
jurisdictions hold that a restrictive covenant with a duration of three
years or longer is presumptively unreasonable.' 9 A covenant not to
enforcement of the noncompete is necessary "(1) to prevent an employee's solicitation or
disclosure of trade secrets, (2) to prevent an employee's release of confidential
information regarding the employer's customers, or (3) in those cases where the
employee's services to the employer are deemed special or unique." EarthWeb, Inc. v.
Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 173
F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1999)).
15. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 cmt. d (1979).
16. Simpson v. C&R Supply, Inc., 598 N.W.2d 914, 918 (S.D. 1999).
17. PHP HealthCare Corp. v. EMSA Ltd. Partn., 14 F.3d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 1993)
(applying Virginia law); Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 957 (D. Minn. 1999);
Davis v. Albany Area Primary Health Care, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 909, 911 (Ga. App. 1998);
Darugar v. Hodges, 471 S.E.2d 33, 36 (Ga. App. 1996); Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d
80, 83 (Ind. App. 1995); Henderson Implement Co., Inc. v. Langley, 707 S.2d 482, 485 (La.
App. 1998); Evan's World Travel, Inc. v. Adams, 978 S.W.2d 225, 233-34 (Tex. App.
1998); Posey v. Monier Resources, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 915, 918-19 (Tex. App. 1989).
18. Concord Orthopedics Prof. Ass'n v. Forbes, 702 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1997) (holding
that a 25-mile territorial radius was reasonable); Keeley v. Cardiovascular Surgical Assocs.,
P.C., 510 S.E.2d 880, 884 (Ga. App. 1999) (holding that a 75-mile territorial radius was
reasonable); Delli-Gatti v. Mansfield, 477 S.E.2d 134, 136-38 (Ga. App. 1996) (holding that
a prohibition on working in same county was reasonable); Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis &
Med. Clinic, Inc., 470 S.E.2d 252, 255 (Ga. App. 1996) (holding that a 60-mile territorial
radius was reasonable); National Emerg. Servs. v. Wetherby, 456 S.E.2d 639, 641 (Ga. App.
1995) (holding that a prohibition on working in same hospital was reasonable); Dominy v.
National Emergency Servs., 451 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ga. App. 1994) (holding that a
prohibition on working in same emergency room was reasonable); Silvers, Asher, Sher &
McLaren, M.D.s Neurology, P.C. v. Batchu, 16 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a 75-mile territorial radius was reasonable); contra Valley Med. Specialists v.
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283-84 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that five-mile territorial radius was
unreasonable).
19. Flickenger v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., 732 S.2d 33, 34 (Fla. Dist. App. 1999);
accord Valley Med. Specialists, 982 P.2d at 1284-85 (holding that a three-year noncompete
unenforceable); Maxon v. Franklin Traffic Serv., Inc., 689 N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (N.Y. App.
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compete for one to two years will usually be enforced.' In rapidly
moving fields such as information technology, where trade
information becomes obsolete within a matter of months, "a one-year
hiatus from the workforce is several generations, if not an eternity., 2'
Accordingly, courts have been less willing to enforce noncompetes
under such circumstances.
Similarly, the range of activities prohibited by the noncompete
must be reasonable. In BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,23 for instance, a
New York court held that a restrictive covenant contained in an
accountant's employment agreement was overbroad to the extent that
it prohibited the accountant from providing services to (1) his
personal clients,24 and (2) those clients he had not served to any
significant extent while employed at the firm.25 In American Building
Services, Inc. v. Cohen,26 an Ohio court found that a noncompetition
agreement prohibiting a business manager from working for a
competitor was overbroad, but that a restriction on disclosing the
former employer's confidential business information would be
enforceable. In Delli-Gatti v. Mansfield on the other hand, a
Georgia court found that a restrictive covenant prohibiting a
physician from practicing all forms of medicine was reasonable in
scope, although the physician's specialty was pediatrics.
Some states have statutory restrictions on the enforceability of
Div. 1999) (holding that a five-year restriction unenforceable).
20. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 S.2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. App. 1998)
(holding that three-year noncompete was enforceable for two years only); The Jewett
Orthopaedic Clinic, P.A. v. White, 629 S.2d 922, 927 (Fla. Dist. App. 1993) (holding that a
two-year restriction was reasonable); Augusta Eye Ctr., P.C. v. Duplessie, 506 S.E.2d 242
(Ga. App. 1998); Delli-Gatti, 477 S.E.2d at 137 (holding that a one-year restriction was
reasonable); Saxton, 470 S.E.2d at 808-908 (holding that a two-year restriction was
reasonable); Dominy, 451 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that a two-year restriction was
reasonable); Vascular & General Surgical Assoc., Ltd. v. Loiterman, 599 N.E.2d 1246, 1253
(I11. App. 1992) (holding that a two-year restriction was reasonable).
21. EarthWeb Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
22. Id. at 313; see also Doubleclick Inc. v. Henderson, 1997 WL 731413 at *8 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (enjoining former employee from establishing competing internet
company for six months after termination of employment).
23. 712 N.E.2d 1220 (N.Y. 1999).
24. Id at 1225; contra Prairie Eye Ctr., Ltd. v. Butler, 713 N.E.2d 610, 615 (Il. App.
1999) (holding that an employer demonstrated sufficient protectable interest in patients of
ophthalmologist, with whom ophthalmologist had preexisting professional relationship, to
justify enforcement of noncompete even as to those patients, and not just to those patients
he acquired while working for employer).
25. BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1225.
26. 603 N.E.2d 432,434-35 (Ohio App. 1992).
27. 477 S.E.2d at 137.
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post-employment covenants not to compete, most of which track the
common law with relatively minor modifications." The most
significant exception is California, which prohibits any "contract by
which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade
or business,, 29 thereby rendering post-employment noncompetes void
as a matter of law.
Finally, courts disagree on the issue of whether a post-
employment covenant not to compete containing unreasonable
restrictions on an employee's future employment may be modified by
the court to impose reasonable restrictions, or must be stricken in its
entirety. The majority rule is that the court has discretion to limit an
unreasonable covenant's geographical area, period of enforceability,
and/or scope of activity to make it reasonable." A minority of
jurisdictions holds that a post-employment noncompetition clause
must stand or fall in its entirety; it may not be judicially reformed to
28. The Florida statute is typical:
Contracts in restraint of trade invalid; exceptions. -
(1) Every contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade or business of any kind, otherwise than is provided by
subsections (2) and (3) hereof, is to that extent void.
(2)(a) One who sells the good will of a business, or any shareholder of a
corporation selling or otherwise disposing of all of his shares in said
corporation, may agree with the buyer, and one who is employed as an
agent, or independent contractor, or employee may agree with his
employer, to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar business
and from soliciting old customers of such employer within a reasonably
limited time and area, so long as the buyer or any person deriving title to
the good will from him, and so long as such employer, continues to carry
on a like business therein. Said agreements may, in the discretion of a
court of competent jurisdiction be enforced by injunction.
(3) Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the
partnership, agree that all or some of them will not carry on a similar
business within a reasonably limited time and area.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.33 (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
29. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West Supp. 2001).
30. E.g. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F. Supp. 2d 667, 683 (S.D. Ind.
1998); Laidlaw, Inc. v. Student Transp. of Am., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 727, 754 (D.N.J. 1998);
Leon M. Reimer & Co., P.C. v. Cipolla, 929 F. Supp. 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Natl.
Interstate Ins. Co. v. Perro, 934 F. Supp. 883, 890 (N.D. Ohio 1996); La Calhene, Inc. v.
Spolyar, 938 F. Supp. 523, 528 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (applying Minn. law); L.G. Balfour Co. v.
McGinnis, 759 F. Supp. 840 (D.D.C. 1991) (applying Mass. law); Data Management, Inc. v.
Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988); Flickenger, 732 S.2d at 34; Fowler v. Printers II,
Inc., 598 A.2d 794, 802 (Md. 1991); Scariano Bros., Inc. v. Sullivan, 719 S.2d 131, 133 (La.
App. 1998); Key Temporary Personnel v. Cox, 884 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Okla. App. 1994);
Ward v. Midcom, Inc., 575 N.W.2d 233,238 (S.D. 1998).
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make it enforceable. 1
If a covenant not to compete is held enforceable, the next issue
becomes the appropriate remedy for its breach. From the employer's
perspective, specific performance of the covenant not to compete has
two advantages: (1) it gives the employer greater leverage over a
breaching employee because ordinary contract damages will
frequently be smaller than the gain the employee will realize if she
breaches; and (2) specific performance avoids the valuation problem
that would otherwise face an employer seeking damages for breach of
a covenant not to compete. 32 Most courts follow the Restatement on
the issue of remedy as well as enforcement: "[A] promise to render
personal service exclusively for one employer will not be enforced by
an injunction against serving another if its probable result ... will be
to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a
living., 33 As a general matter:
an injunction will not be ordered if the remedy in damages
would be adequate. Damages are likely to be adequate to
protect the employer's interest unless the employee's
services are unique or extraordinary, either because of
special skill that he possesses or because of special
knowledge that he has acquired of the employer's business.
Even if damages are not adequate, however, 'an injunction
will not be granted if its probable result will be to leave the
employee without other reasonable means of making a
living.'
31. Smarte Carte, Inc. v. Colon, 47 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (D.P.R. 1999); see also
Presto-X-Company v. Beller, 568 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Neb. 1997); Streiff v. American Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 348 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. 1984); Wolff v. Prot~gg Sys., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 429,
433-34 (Ga. App. 1998); Hartman v. W.H. Odell & Assocs., 450 S.E.2d 912, 920 (N.C.
App. 1994); cf. Vantage Technology, L.L. C. v. Cross, 17 S.W.2d 637, 647 (Tenn. App.
1999) (A restrictive covenant that is deliberately overbroad would be stricken in its
entirety to protect against employers drafting overly broad language, secure in the
knowledge that the sole sanction would be modification to render the covenant
reasonable.).
32. Stewart A..Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 Va. L. Rev. 383,
388-89 (1993).
33. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367(2) (1981). Technically, this section of
the Restatement addresses only the proper remedy for breach of a personal services
contract. However, it has had significant influence on the development of the common-law
doctrine regarding the appropriate remedy for breach of a noncompete agreement. See
e.g. Am. Broad. Co. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y.1981); Clooney v. WCPO Television
Div. of Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 300 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio App. 1973); Skyland
Broad. Corp. v. Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 783 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1957)
34. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367 cmt. c (1981).
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Timing, as well as the merits of the employer's claim, becomes an
issue with regard to the specific performance of a post-employment
covenant not to compete. As a practical matter, an employer that
fails to obtain a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
on an expedited basis is likely to find that its claim for equitable relief
is moot by the time the case comes to trial. Courts have responded in
two ways when the employer's entitlement to an injunction is
established after the time period in the noncompete agreement has
ended. Some courts grant an award of damages;35 others enjoin the
employee from competing with the former employer under the terms
of the noncompete agreement for a period beginning on the date
judgment is entered.36 Conversely, an employee who is preliminarily
enjoined from competing against his employer and then prevails at
trial or on appeal is entitled to damages for the wrongly issued
injunction.37
The bottom line is that enforcement of post-employment
covenants not to compete is determined on a case-by case basis, and
can be difficult to predict ex ante. Determinations of what constitute
"reasonable" restrictions in terms of geography, time, and scope of
activity vary widely. Some courts will reform an overbroad restrictive
covenant to make it enforceable; others will not.38 If a covenant not to
compete is enforced, the court must determine whether specific
performance of the covenant not to compete should be ordered, or
whether damages would be an adequate remedy.
II
Covenants Not to Compete in the Entertainment Industry
Employee noncompete agreements are commonly used for
certain types of performers in the entertainment industry, although
such agreements are rare for on-air or on-stage talent. Free-lance and
single-project work, rather than long-term employment, is the
industry norm, and noncompetes would effectively prevent most
performers from obtaining employment on a regular basis. However,
35. E.g. Gaylord Broad. Co. v. Cosmos Broad. Corp., 746 F.2d 251, 253 (5th Cir.
1984); Cullman Broad. Co., Inc. v. Bosley, 373 S.2d 830, 837 (Ala. 1979).
36. New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 429 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Va. 1993); Asher,
Sher & McLaren, M.D.s Neurology, P.C. v. Batchu, 16 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Mo. App. 2000).
37. Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. Loescher, 291 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1980).
38. Even in jurisdictions where judicial reformation of overbroad noncompetes is
permitted, courts do not always use their discretion to do so. See e.g. EarthWeb; Inc. v.
Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 299, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Crippen v. United Petroleum Feedstocks,
Inc., 666 N.Y.S.2d 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
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there are exceptions to this rule. News broadcasters,39 radio disc
jockeys and other personalities, Las Vegas performers,0 professional
wrestlers,41 and exotic dancers'2 are commonly subject to post-
employment noncompete agreements.
What these professions have in common is that the employee,
unlike many professional entertainers, is portraying a persona that is
to a large extent equated with the employee himself. That is, when
Vivien Leigh plays Scarlett O'Hara, she portrays a character who is
unquestionably different from herself. When Walter Cronkite
presents the evening news, on the other hand, he is to some extent
"playing" himself - presenting a persona that may or may not have
much in common with the off-screen Walter Cronkite, but which
viewers equate with the man himself. Frequently, the on-air or on-
stage persona is developed to a large extent by the hiring entity,
which invests both in the creation of the persona and in advertising it
to the public at large.43
Recall that the general purpose of post-employment covenants
not to compete is to allow employers optimal investment in product
development, employee training, and customer relations by giving
employers assurances that they will be able to reap the rewards of
those investments." The application to the broadcasting industry is
patent. Broadcasters invest in developing and advertising "products"
- in this case, newscasters - for the markets they serve. In order to
provide their broadcasting employees with firm-specific human
capital, they provide those employees with information about the
local area, access to local and regional news contacts, and local
39. An informal survey conducted in 1989 indicated that 76% of television stations
"always" include noncompete agreements in written employment contracts with their on-
air talent, and that most of the remaining stations "sometimes" require such covenants.
Jon H. Sylvester, Validity of Post-Employment Non-Compete Covenants in Broadcast
News Employment Contracts, 11 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 423,454-55 (1989).
40. Walt Belcher, Tampa Bay's King of Comedy, Tampa Tribune 21 (June 9,2000).
41. Sandra A. Papile, Can't Tell Federations Without a Scorecard, N.J. Star-Ledger
42 (Oct. 21, 1999).
42. See Diamond Talent, Inc. v. Smith, 653 So. 2d 290 (Ala. 1995).
43. I do not mean, by making this distinction, to minimize the marketing value of
creating an identifiable public image for performers who play roles other than
"themselves." Unquestionably, the images of performers such as Marilyn Monroe and
Tippi Hedron were largely created by the studios for which those performers worked. In
those cases, as is true of the noncompetes that are the subject of this paper, the
investments in creating the persona were made by individuals or entities with whom the
performers had an ongoing business relationship, and who could expect to reap the
rewards of their investments in developing those personae.
44. See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79
Va. L. Rev. 383, 389-394 (1993).
advertising exposure, in additional to general job training. They
develop customer relations with viewers by advertising campaigns
promoting the on-air talent."
A newscaster who becomes successful while working for station
WXYZ and then accepts employment with WXYZ's local competitor
effectively robs WXYZ not only of its investment in employee
training, but also of its investments in product development and
customer relations, by taking the "product" WXYZ has created to the
competitor. Without some assurance that the newscaster will remain
with WXYZ, WXYZ may be unwilling to invest in promoting the
broadcaster.
An additional consideration, peculiar to the entertainment
industry, is the high risks and high rewards that characterize on-air
employment. For any given performer in whom an employer invests,
there is a significant risk that the investment will not pay off. For the
few performers who do succeed, however, the monetary return on the
investment is significant. Thus, an employer faced with the prospect
of investing in several performers, few of whom will produce a return
on its investment, has a natural incentive to take steps to ensure that
the few performers who do succeed will not "take the money and
run" as soon as the employer's investment begins to pay off. From the
employer's perspective, a post-employment noncompete agreement is
necessary to protect the employer's investment in developing and
marketing the employee's performance.46
From the employee's perspective, there are both costs and
benefits associated with entering into covenants not to compete with
the employer after the term of employment has ended. The cost the
employee incurs is the inability to broadcast in the local market for a
certain period of time after her employment contract has terminated.
Thus, she is put to a forced choice between (1) leaving the geographic
area to ply her trade, or (2) taking employment in another field until
the noncompete agreement expires.
The benefit the employee gains is the employer's investment in
developing and marketing her as a newscaster. The employee, as well
as the employer, benefits from the station's promotion of her and
from the exposure she receives in the local market. The employee
45. Such promotional campaigns can be expensive, even in mid-size markets. See
Beckman v. Cox Broad. Corp., 296 S.E.2d 566, 568 n. 2 (Ga. 1982) (Atlanta television
station spent over $750,000 promoting weatherman.); Midwest Television, Inc. v. Oloffson,
699 N.E.2d 230, 234 (Ill. App. 1998) (Peoria, Illinois radio station spent $378,330 for
television commercials promoting disc jockey.).
46. Sylvester, supra n. 39.
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benefits from the news contacts she gains through her job. The
employer's investment in the newscaster contributes significantly to
the value of the newscaster's human capital."
Exactly how these costs and benefits play out in any given case
will depend on the employee's own personal circumstances. Consider
the following example:
Toledo, Ohio is a mid-sized broadcasting market, with a
population of about 300,000 in the metropolitan area. Toledo is
located approximately 60 miles from Detroit, Michigan, 100 miles
from Cleveland, Ohio, 120 miles from Columbus, Ohio, 200 miles
from Cincinnati, Ohio, and 100 miles from Ft. Wayne, Indiana. The
only community of any size within a fifty-mile radius of Toledo is
Bowling Green, Ohio, with a population of about 28,000.
A Toledo television station, WTOL, hires two newscasters, Bing
and Bob, and asks them to sign standard noncompete agreements
providing that they will not work as on-air news talent for any
competing station within a fifty-mile radius for one year after the
termination of their contracts with WTOL.
Bing is a young up-and-coming newscaster who is originally from
Los Angeles. After earning his broadcasting degree, he interviewed
all over the country, and took the job in Toledo partly because it was
the largest market and best-paying job available to him, and partly
because he believed the Toledo job offered the best chance for
advancement to a larger market. Bing views Toledo as a stepping-
stone. He has no established ties to Toledo, and he is willing to
relocate anywhere to further his career.
When Bing moved to Toledo for the broadcasting job, he knew
little about the community. Bing relied heavily on the information he
learned from more experienced members of the WTOL news team, as
well as the contacts he made through them, to improve his own
newsgathering ability. Bing recognizes that success in the
entertainment industry is chancy, and that his success in the market
depends heavily on the amount of promotion WTOL gives him.
Bob, on the other hand, is a Toledo native who has lived and
worked in the area for over twenty years. Prior to taking the news-
casting job with WTOL, Bob worked as a print news reporter. He
knows everything there is to know about Toledo, and has a well-
47. "[I]f the [performer] does not have enough personal assets to engage in effective
self-promotion - a common phenomenon with artists who have yet to develop a
reputation - the [hiring entity] may be the only entity capable of investing in the
[performer]." Sterk, supra n. 44.
developed array of news contacts. Bob does not view Toledo as a
stepping-stone to a larger market; he intends to spend the rest of his
life in Toledo. His family, friends, and other ties are local. Since
Bob's name is already familiar to Toledo residents because of his
experience with the local newspaper, he believes that his success as a
newscaster will have less to do with WTOL's promotional campaigns
than with his own ability to do the job.
It is predictable that Bing and Bob will have vastly different
responses to the broadcast station's demand that they enter into
noncompete agreements. For Bing, the ex ante cost of signing a
noncompete is small, since he expects for his next job to be in a
geographic area outside the region covered by the noncompete. For
Bob, on the other hand, signing a noncompete agreement will
effectively bar him from engaging in his chosen profession for the
duration of the noncompete, since he does not want to move to
another area. Similarly, the two newscasters are likely to perceive the
benefits associated with signing the noncompete differently. For Bing,
signing the noncompete gives WTOL the assurance it needs to invest
in promoting him fully, a state of affairs which Bing wants to
encourage. For Bob, the only perceived benefit of signing the
noncompete is that it enables him to get the job, since he attaches
little value to the station's promotional efforts in his behalf.
The broadcast station's level of investment, and therefore its
protectable interest, in the two newscasters is also likely to be
different for the same reasons. Bing will not initially bring any
"customers" - or rating points to the station because he is unknown in
the local area. Whatever market value Bing develops over the next
several months will depend to a certain extent on the name
recognition the station's promotional campaign provides him. Bob, on
the other hand, is likely to bring viewers to the newscast as soon as his
presence at the station is known, because his name is already familiar
to Toledo residents. The point is that individual newscasters may be
very differently situated with regard to noncompete agreements in
their employment contracts, even if those agreements are phrased
identically.
There are very few reported cases addressing the enforceability
of post-employment covenants not to compete for on-air talent in the
entertainment industry. In determining whether to enforce such
agreements, courts consider the same factors that are considered with
regard to the enforcement of covenants not to compete in other
contexts.
First, a covenant not to compete will be enforced only if
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enforcement is necessary to protect the employer's legitimate
business interests. Traditionally, those protectable interests have been
limited to confidential business information, near-permanent
customer relations, and "unique" services.48 Since the protection of
confidential business information is rarely an issue when on-air talent
moves from one broadcasting station to another, broadcast stations
have generally relied on claims that enforcement of a noncompete
agreement is necessary to protect its promotional investment in near-
permanent customer relations," i.e., ratings points, or that the on-air
48. Professors Closius and Schaffer have argued that only employer trade secrets
should be protected:
Although trade secrets and confidential information are properly
included within the scope of the principal's protectable interests, an
agent's exposure to customers or possession of unique skills is not. The
agent's attributes are therefore irrelevant in determining the scope of
protectable information.
An agent's relationship with customers is a function of individual
personality and particular market skills unless the information at the
core of the relationship qualifies as a trade secret or confidential
information. Similarly, an agent's heightened level of expertise or
competence is a skill belonging to the agent if it is not attributable to
trade secrets or confidential information. Including either quality
within the ambit of a protectable interest insulates the principal from a
former agent's legitimate competition.
Philip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Servitude: The Current Judicial
Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete - A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 531, 544-45 (1984).
49. Courts use a two-part test to determine whether an employee's defection to a
competitor damages the employer's interest in near-permanent customer relations. The
first part of the test has seven factors: (1) the number of years the employer needs to
develop its clientele; (2) the money invested to develop a clientele; (3) the difficulty
involved in developing the clientele; (4) the extent of personal customer contact by the
employee; (5) the employer's degree of knowledge of its customers; (6) the time the
customers have been associated with the employer; and (7) the continuity of relationships
between the employer. The second part of the test requires the court to consider whether
the employee would have had contact with the customers but for his job with the
employer. McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1311-13 (I11. App. 1985). The
mere fact of customer contact is not sufficient. Rather, the employer must show that the
employee's contact with customers was of such a nature that the customer could be
expected to move with the employee. As one court put it:
Take the elevator operator. Who more regularly and frequently
contacts his employer's customers? Yet who ever heard of a tenant
moving from the Union Commerce Building to the Terminal Tower or
Caxton Building because an elevator operator did? * * * If the deans
of the Harvard and Yale law schools exchanged chairs it might be very
unflattering to see how few, if any, of their students would try to
talent's services are unique."0 In recent years courts have generally
rejected the uniqueness argument, recognizing that the employer
cannot claim a protectable interest in having the performer continue
to work for it, and that the real injury to the employer is the fact that
the employer's competitor is profiting from the employer's
investment."
In West Group Broadcasting, Ltd. v. Bell,52 for instance, radio
station KXDG hired the employee to work as a radio announcer
hosting an evening country music program, and created and
promoted the name and persona of "Hurricane Hannah" for the
employee. After seven months on the job, the employee resigned and
took a job with a competing radio station in the same area, in
violation of a 180-day noncompete agreement in her employment
contract with KXDG.53 At the new station, the employee co-hosted a
morning contemporary music program, and used the name "Robin
Kane."54  On those facts, the court refused to enforce the
noncompetition clause, holding that the employer had not
follow them.
Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 705-06 (Ohio Com.
Pl. 1952).
50. The uniqueness argument has its genesis in the English case of Lumley v.
Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852), which involved a suit to enforce a personal services
contract. Wagner, an opera singer, had contracted to sing at Lumley's opera house for a
period of three months, and then repudiated the contract. The court refused specifically to
enforce the contract to perform at Lumley's theater, but enjoined Wagner from
performing elsewhere during the term of the contract.
The theory underlying the holding is that where the services of the performer
are unique, it is impossible to ascertain the damages to the employer that result from the
performer's breach of her contract to perform, and enforcement of an implied negative
covenant not to compete discourages breach by removing the financial inducement for the
employee to breach. See Harry Rogers Theatrical Enters. v. Comstock, 232 N.Y.S. 1 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1928); see generally Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of
Contract, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1375-76 (1982). In other words, the purpose behind the
doctrine is to induce the employee to honor the employment agreement. So understood,
the doctrine has limited applicability in the context of post-employment covenants not to
compete, since by definition the employee is not presently in an employment relationship
with the employer. It is not legitimate for the former employer to claim damages resulting
from its employee's resignation where that resignation was not wrongful.
For a general discussion of the "unique services" theory, see Margaret N.
Kniffin, Employee Noncompetition Covenants: The Perils of Performing Unique Services,
10 Rutgers L.J. 25, 36-52 (1978).
51. Nigra v. Young Broad. of Albany, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998); American Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 52 N.Y.S.2d 394, 403 (N.Y. 1981).
52. 942 S.W.2d 934 (Mo. App. 1997).
53. Id. at 935.
54. Id. at 936.
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demonstrated a protectable business interest:
Although West created "Hurricane Hannah" as Bell's radio
personality and used its resources to promote "Hurricane
Hannah" as part of KXDG's image, there is no evidence that
at KSYN Bell ever used or attempted to capitalize on that
personality or name recognition. The only things that Bell
took with her and used when she went from KXDG to
KSYN were her aptitude skill, mental ability, and the voice
with which she was born.
51
Since an employer cannot use a noncompete clause to insulate
itself from ordinary competition,56 and the employee was not
misappropriating the investment KXDG had made in promoting her
as "Hurricane Hannah," enforcement of the covenant not to compete
was denied. 7
Bell is distinguishable from other cases, such as Midwest
Television, Inc. v. Oloffson 8 T.K. Communications, Inc. v. Herman,59
and Beckman v. Cox Broadcasting Corp.' in which courts found that
employers had interests in protecting their promotional investments
in employees when the employees had moved to rival stations and
attempted to capitalize on the reputations they had developed under
their former employers.
Another issue that may be raised with regard to protection of the
employer's interest in promoting the talent is the likelihood that a
radio announcer will be able to induce listeners to switch stations,
merely on the strength of his ability as an announcer. Enforcement of
a noncompete agreement was denied in KWEL, Inc. v. Prassel,6'
where the employee's on-air job at his new radio station consisted
solely of giving the time, temperature, and station identification. The
court found it unlikely that any listeners would switch stations based
55. Id. at 938.
56. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 614 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Wis.
App. 2000); Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co., 994 S.W.2d 468,472 (Ark. 1999).
57. Bell, 942 S.W.2d at 939.
58. 699 N.E.2d 230, 234 (Ill. App. 1998). "[W]e consider whether Oloffson would
have had exposure to Midwest's listeners and advertisers but for his job with the station.
We conclude that he would not. No advertisers or listeners came with him to Peoria in
1987. Only through Midwest did he develop extensive contacts with both local listeners
and advertisers." Id. at 234.
59. 505 S.2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. App. 1987).
60. 296 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ga. 1982).
61. 527 S.W.2d 821,822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
on the quality of the hourly station identification.62
In Bell, on the other hand, the fact that the employee had
switched from country/western to a contemporary music format was a
significant factor in the court's refusal to enforce the noncompete.
The "different musical genres" argument was rejected in Cullman
Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Bosley,63 where the employee, like
Bell, switched from a country/western station to a popular music
station. The court rejected Bosley's argument that the two radio
stations would necessarily have different groups of listeners, holding
that "the diversity between fans of country and western music and
fans of popular music is not so generally recognized and established
as to constitute common knowledge." ' In the absence of a specific
showing that the broadcasting station had not lost listeners, the
station was entitled to a presumption that Bosley's defection had
caused it harm.5
A second requisite for the enforcement of a covenant not to
compete is that the restraint be reasonable as to duration. In
Richmond Brothers v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company,66 a five-
year covenant not to compete was held to be unreasonably long. The
employee in Richmond Brothers had honored the noncompete for
three years, and then taken a job that violated the noncompete.67
After three years, the court held, "the restrictive covenant ... is no
longer reasonably necessary for the protection of the plaintiff's
business."68 Covenants not to compete lasting from six months to a
year have been found reasonable in duration."
62. Id. at 822.
63. 373 S.2d 830, 832 (Ala. 1979).
64. Id. (No evidence had been admitted at trial concerning the type of music aired
by each station; the trial court took judicial notice of that information. Nor was any
evidence presented as to whether any listeners had followed Bosley to his new station. The
Alabama Supreme Court expressed displeasure with the inadequacy of the evidence
presented, and ultimately based its determination that the noncompete was enforceable
largely on the absence of evidence that it should not be enforced. The court did not
expressly discuss the burden of proof issue.).
65. Id. at 832.
66. 256 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Mass. 1970).
67. Id. at 306.
68. Id. at 307-08.
69. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d at 234 (one year); New River Media Group, Inc. v.
Knighton, 429 S.E.2d (Va. 1993) (one year); Pino v. Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla., Inc., 564
So. 2d 186 (Fla. Dist. App. 1990) (one year); Beckman, 296 S.E.2d at 566, 569 (six months);
Bosley, 373 S.2d at 836-38 (one year); Clooney v. WCPO Television Div. of Scripps
Howard Broad. Co., 300 N.E.2d 256 (Ohio App. 1973) (one year); Skyland Broad. Corp. v.
Hamby, 141 N.E.2d 783 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1957) (8 months).
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Next, a covenant not to compete will be enforced only if it is
reasonable as to geographic scope. In the context of broadcasting
noncompetes, the broadcasting range of the station at which the
employee worked provides a general rule of thumb as to geographic
reasonableness. A restriction that covers the station's broadcast
market will generally be held to be a reasonable geographic
restriction.70 Geographic restrictions outside of the broadcasting range
of the station at which the employee worked are generally held to be
unreasonable.71
The scope of activities prohibited in a covenant not to compete
must be reasonable as well. In the broadcasting industry, disputes
over the enforcement of noncompetes arise when the noncompetition
clause prohibits the employee from working for a competitor in a
wide range of capacities outside the employee's job duties at the
original broadcasting station, or in "any" capacity. In Capital Cities
Communications, Inc. v. Sheehan,72 a Connecticut court denied
enforcement of a noncompetition clause prohibiting a newscaster
from making "any on-the-air appearances" for a competing station.
The court reasoned that the clause was too broad because it was not
limited to the broadcasting of news, even though the employee had
been hired as a news anchor at his new station.73 In Bosley, on the
other hand, the Alabama Supreme Court made a factual inquiry into
the employee's actual duties with his new employer to determine
whether a contractual restriction prohibiting the employee from
taking "any" employment with a competitor was overbroad:
The trial court found that the covenant was too broad
because it restrained the employee "from any type of
70. Oloffson, 699 N.E.2d at 235 (100 mile radius of broadcasting tower); Knighton,
429 S.E.2d at 26 (60 mile radius); Pino, 564 S.2d at 187 (two counties); Beckman, 296
S.E.2d at 567 (35 mile radius); Bosley, 393 S.2d at 836 (one county); Clooney, N.E.2d at
237 (100 mile radius); Hamby, 141 N.E.2d at 784 (35 mile radius).
71. Bennett v. Storz Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 899 (Minn. 1965) (holding that a
noncompete prohibiting employee from working within 35-mile radius of any station
owned by broadcasting company was unreasonable, where company owned several
stations nationwide); WAKE Broadcasters, Inc. v. Crawford, 114 S.E.2d 26, 27 (Ga. 1960)
(holding that a noncompete prohibiting employee from working within 50-mile radius of
any station owned by broadcasting company was unreasonable, where company owned
several stations nationwide). In Storz Broad. Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1965), which involved a noncompete clause identical to the one at issue in Bennett,
the Florida Court of Appeals invalidated the noncompete clause by finding that it did not
survive the termination of the employment contract.
72. No. CV-83-0218242-S (New Haven, Conn. Dist. Ct. July 21, 1983) (reported in 5
No. 6 Ent. L. Rep. 11 (Nov. 1983)).
73. Id.
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employment or in any activity in connection with any radio
station, television station or CATV system." The court
reasoned that the covenant prevented the employee from
being "employed or connected in any manner with any of
these type facilities in any capacity, including that of janitor."
The potential invalidity of this covenant on grounds of
overbreadth does not compel the conclusion that it is
overbroad as applied. If the employer was trying to prevent
its former employee from working as a janitor with a
competitor, we might be faced with the prospect of striking
down an unreasonable limitation or restriction. In this case,
however, the employer is seeking to restrain a radio
announcer from announcing on a rival radio station.74
The court enforced the restrictive covenant, although the
employer was limited to a damages remedy.75
The noncompete covenant at issue in Murray v. Lowndes County
Broadcasting Company76 prohibited the employee, a radio announcer,
from taking a job as an "announcer, disc jockey, advertisement
selling, station manager or director" for any competing radio station
in the broadcasting market area for a period of two years after his
employment ended.77 The employee was hired by a competing station
as a general manager, in violation of the noncompete, and the
employee argued that the restrictive covenant was overbroad to the
extent that it prohibited him from working for a radio station in any
capacity other than as on-air talent." The court rejected that
argument, finding there was "evidence that Murray had participated
in the development of a format and mode of operation for WJEM, a
country music station, and that the station would be harmed if these
plans and procedures were revealed to WGAF, also a country music
station in the same county., 79 The court enforced the restrictive
covenant and enjoined the employee from working for the competing
station as a general manager.8"
Finally, if the noncompete is to be enforced, the employer's
legitimate interest in protecting its investment cannot be outweighed
by the hardship to the employee and the harm to the public. In Nigra
74. 373 S.2d at 835.
75. Id. at 837-38.
76. 284 S.E.2d 10 (Ga. 1981).
77. Id. at 10.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 11.
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v. Young Broadcasting of Albany,81 the court refused to enforce a
one-year covenant not to compete on the ground that the employer's
interest was outweighed by the harm to the employee, where the
employee was a native of the area with family ties that effectively
prevented her from moving, and the effect of the noncompete would
be to prevent her from working in her profession.
Thus, the judicial enforcement of post-employment covenants
not to compete in the broadcasting industry, as is the case with
noncompetes generally, is difficult to predict in any given case. Courts
are divided on the issue of what constitutes a protectable interest of
the employer. With regard to the duration of the restrictive covenant,
some courts find that an employee's marketability will not be
substantially diminished by a year-long enforced absence from the
airwaves;82 others seem to follow a rule derived from the concept that
in some fields of endeavor, "a one-year hiatus from the workforce is
several generations, if not an eternity."83 Regarding the scope of the
restrictive covenant, some courts will enforce a noncompete only to
the extent that it covers the same type of broadcasting in the same
type of market; 4 others will enforce a noncompete to the extent that
it restricts the employee from performing any on-air functions,85 and
others will enforce even a noncompete that prohibits the employee
from providing services that are ancillary to on-air broadcasting.86
The unpredictability of enforcement in the case of broadcasting
noncompetes is exacerbated by the fact that most broadcasting
employment contracts contain clauses mandating the arbitration of all
claims arising under the contract. Arbitrators make their decisions on
the basis of a limited evidentiary record, and the right of appeal is
extremely limited. Since arbitration decisions do not have
precedential value, the written opinions explaining the reasoning
underlying their judgments are frequently sketchy or nonexistent, and
there are no standard reporters for such decisions, creating a high risk
of inconsistent decisions.87
81. 67 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). It also appears from the trial court's
opinion that the employer never presented evidence that it had made promotional
investments in the employee, and attempted to rely solely on the argument that the
employee's services were unique. As discussed above, the "unique services" argument has
little relevance once the employment contract has ended. See supra n. 50.
82. Beckman, 296 S.E.2d at 569.
83. See supra n. 22.
84. See generally Bell, 942 S.W.2d 934; Richmond Bros., 256 N.E.2d 304.
85. Bosley, 373 S.2d 830.
86. Murray, 284 S.E.2d 10.
87. See Dan Trigoboff, WFAA-TV Noncompete Upheld, 129 Broad. & Cable 80
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
An individual newscaster who desires to change employment in
the face of a covenant not to compete has several options: (1) he can
take a job that violates the noncompete agreement, and hope that the
court or arbitrator will refuse to enforce the covenant;88 (2) he can
bring a preemptive suit for a declaratory judgment that the
noncompete is invalid;89 (3) he can move to a different geographic
market; (4) he can negotiate with the original employer for a release
from the noncompete;' or (5) he can "wait out" the period of the
noncompete by taking employment with a rival station that does not
conflict with the noncompete.9'
III
Legislation Prohibiting the Enforcement of Broadcast Industry
Noncompetes
Faced with the widespread use of covenants not to compete for
television newscasters and radio personalities, and perceived
overreaching by broadcasting stations in insisting on such covenants,
the American Federation of Television and Radio and Television
Artists ("AFTRA"), which represents television newscasters and
radio announcers, has begun attacking the enforceability of such
provisions in state legislatures. AFTRA began its legislative efforts in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, where separate bills to make
noncompete clauses unenforceable in the broadcasting industry were
introduced in 1992,92 1994,9' 1995,94 and 1997.9' On August 7, 1998, the
legislature enacted the 1997 bill, which provides that:
Any contract or agreement which creates or establishes the
terms of employment for an employee or individual in the
(Sept. 20, 1999).
88. See e.g. Bell, 942 S.W.2d at 942 (Crow, J., dissenting) (Employee testified that
the new employer told her his lawyers would "take care of it.").
89. Supra n. 51; supra n. 69.
90. See Joe Schlosser, Loesch to Head Henson TV: Cable Channel in Works Will
Leverage Brand in Competition with Fox Family, Disney, 128 Broad. & Cable, 21, 22 (Feb.
16, 1998).
91. See Bill Carter, NBC and Lou Dobbs Plan Joint Newsletter and Radio Show,
N.Y. Times C7 (Oct. 4, 1999) (New station hired financial news anchor to create financial
newsletter and radio program to avoid conflict with a noncompete preventing him from
taking an on-air television job.); supra n. 60 (New station hired television weatherman as
off-air meteorologist when noncompete prevented him from taking on-air position.).
92. Mass. H. 2614, 177th Gen. Ct., 1992 Reg. Sess. (Feb. 4, 1992).
93. Mass. H. 1448,179th Gen. Ct., 1994 Reg. Sess. (Jan. 21, 1984).
94. Mass. H. 4049,179th Gen. Ct., 1st Annual Sess. (Feb. 17, 1995).
95. Mass. Sen. 76, 181st Gen. Ct., 1997 Reg Sess. (Jan. 1, 1997).
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broadcasting industry, including, television stations,
television networks, radio stations, radio networks, or any
entities affiliated with the foregoing, and which restricts the
right of such employee or individual to obtain employment
in a specified eographic area for a specified period of time
after termination of employment of the employee by the
employer or by termination of the employment relationship
by mutual agreement of the employer and the employee or
by termination of the employment relationship by the
expiration of the contract or agreement, shall be void and
unenforceable with respect to such provision.96
Buoyed by its success in Massachusetts, AFTRA pushed for the
introduction of similar legislation in other states. On June 4, 1999,
Maine passed a statute providing that:
A broadcasting industry contract provision that requires an
employee or prospective employee to refrain from obtaining
employment in a specified geographic area for a specified
period of time following expiration of the contract or upon
termination of employment without fault of the employee is
presumed to be unreasonable.9
As of this writing, legislation prohibiting covenants not to
compete in the broadcasting industry has been introduced in
Connecticut,98 Illinois,9 Maryland,1" Missouri," New Jersey," Rhode
Island, O3 Washington," and West Virginia.'
96. 149 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 149 § 1.
97. 26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 599 (2) (interim version, June 4, 1999).
98. The proposed Connecticut statute generally allows the enforcement of
reasonable noncompetes, but provides that:
No court or other forum in this state shall enforce a noncompete
agreement entered into on or after the effective date of this section
against an employee in the broadcasting industry, which agreement
restricts the right of such employee to obtain employment in such
industry within a specified geographic area for a specified period of
time following termination of employment or expiration of an
employment contract or agreement.
Ct. Sen. 483(b)(2)(A), 2000 Reg. Sess. (Mar. 14, 2000).
99. I11. Sen. 1007, 91st Gen. Assembly (introduced Feb. 25, 1999).
100. Md. H. 1283, 414th Gen. Assembly (introduced Feb. 17, 2000).
101. Mo. Sen. 1025, 90th Gen. Assembly (introduced Feb. 17, 2000).
102. N.J. Sen. 1297, 209th Legis. (introduced May 18, 2000).
103. R.I. H. 7794 (introduced Feb. 3, 2000).
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The effect of this legislation is to impose, by statute, a
nonnegotiable contract term allowing free alienation of the
employee's human capital after the term of employment has ended.
In the absence of such legislation, free post-employment alienability
of the employee's services is a legal default rule. The parties are free
to bargain around that rule as they see fit to further their interests, so
long as the restrictive covenants into which they enter are not
overbroad to the point that they violate public policy. With such
legislation in place, the parties are no longer free to contract around
the legal default rule.
The question raised by this legislation, therefore, is whether the
legislature should interfere with the enforceability of freely
negotiated covenants not to compete in the broadcasting industry.
Note that this is a vastly different question from the question whether
noncompetes are a good idea in the broadcasting industry context. I
take no position on that issue. When a state legislature interferes with
the parties' private contractual relationships, the question becomes
whether, and to what extent, the legislature should intervene to
prohibit the enforcement of covenants not to compete over the
objection of parties who have sought to enter into them, not whether
the parties should have entered into such agreements in the first
place.
IV
Policy Considerations in Evaluating Legislative Prohibitions on
Noncompetes
Covenants not to compete in the broadcast industry exist, as
discussed above, in order to protect the employer's investment in
promoting and developing the on-air talent. Such promotional
investments can benefit both the station, which earns increased
revenues if it is able to attract a larger audience, and the performers
themselves, who gain from increased exposure. At the same time,
such covenants restrict the employee's ability to earn a living once the
term of employment has ended, thereby interfering with the transfer
of the employee's human capital to its highest valued use, and
insulating the employer from competition.
Because free alienation of entitlements is necessary in order to
move goods and services to their highest valued uses, it is generally
104. Wash. Sen. 5942, 56th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Feb. 16, 1999).
105. W.V. H. 4419, 75th Legis. (introduced Feb. 4,2000).
2001] COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY 671
supposed that unencumbered market trades should be allowed unless
a valid reason exists to restrict such trades. 6 Law and economics
scholars argue that in the absence of transactions costs, the parties to
a transaction will bargain for an economically efficient allocation of
resources. 10 7 The legislative imposition of mandatory contract terms -
such as free alienability of human capital after the term of
employment has ended - to which the parties would not agree if left
to their own devices makes both parties worse off.
10 8
The standard neoclassical argument has two steps. First, the fact
that the parties did not bargain for the term in question when left to
their own devices indicates that the cost of the term must exceed its
benefit."° Otherwise, the parties would have agreed to the term on
their own. Thus, if the noncompete clause is worth $10,000 to the
employer, and the employee values the right to compete in the same
market at $20,000, the parties will not agree to a noncompete and no
mandated term is necessary. The parties will enter into a noncompete
only when the employer ascribes greater value to the noncompete
clause than the employee values the right to compete that she is
giving up. Accordingly, the only time the legislation has any practical
effect is when it prevents an economically efficient transaction.
Second, imposing an inefficient mandatory contract term operates as
an effective tax on the parties' transaction with two effects: 1) the
employee's wage falls by an amount between the benefit and the cost
of the contract term; and 2) employment levels drop.n
Stated slightly differently, there are two logical possibilities:
either the contract term at issue is welfare enhancing, or it is not. If
the contract term benefits the parties, we expect them to bargain for it
voluntarily, and legislative imposition of the term is not necessary. If
the contract term does not benefit the parties, it should not be
106. See e.g. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 932 (1985).
107. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1093-94 (1972); J.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work [hereinafter Human
Behavior] (2000) (preliminary draft at 40, on file with author).
109. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1505 (1998) [hereinafter Behavioral
Approach].
110. Id.; Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates (forthcoming 2000) (manuscript
on file with author); Human Behavior, supra n. 108, at 36. Empirical evidence indicates
that employers may transfer the entire cost of the mandated contract term to employees in
the form of lower wages. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity
Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994).
imposed on the parties unless unusual circumstances exist. In
determining whether to impose a contract term on parties who would
otherwise bargain for something else, the question becomes whether
there is a reason to suspect market failure or any other reason to
justify interference with the parties' desires. Such interference may be
justified, for instance, if there is a reason to believe that broadcast
employees systematically may agree to noncompetes that are not in
their interests, or if enforcing noncompetes imposes uncompensated
detrimental effects on third parties to the transaction.
A. Externalities: Anticompetitive Effects
One reason for blocking a voluntary market transaction may be
that the transaction in question will create significant externalities -
unreimbursed costs to third parties.111 The transaction is prohibited
not to protect the employee, but to ensure that other individuals
outside the transaction are not adversely affected.
Examples of legal prohibitions on behavior with third-party
effects are legion. Vote-selling and bribing legislators is illegal not
because we are concerned about harm to individuals who are willing
to buy and sell votes, but because we are concerned about harm to
society at large. Employees cannot waive their rights to be free of
race or sex discrimination, largely because of the effects such a waiver
would have on other people in the workplace. An employer cannot
fire an employee for refusing to commit a crime or for testifying
truthfully in court, because of the effects of such conduct on society
generally.
Covenants not to compete have effects on third parties, and
courts have sometimes refused to enforce them on the basis of their
anticompetitive effects.112 In the broadcasting environment, third-
111. Calabresi & Melamed, supra n. 107, at 1111.
112. Sterk, supra n. 44, at 405-06; see also Newberger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 562
F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Although such issues have not often been raised in the
federal courts, employee agreements not to compete are proper subjects for scrutiny
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. When a company interferes with free competition for
one of its former employee's services, the market's ability to achieve the most
economically efficient allocation of labor is impaired. Moreover, employee
noncompetition clauses can tie up industry expertise and experience and thereby forestall
new entry. In certain cases, postemployment restraints do serve legitimate business
purposes: they prevent a departing employee from expropriating his employer's secrets
and clientele. Consequently, we have held that a per se ban on all such restrictive
covenants would not be warranted.
If section 1 of the Sherman Act were to be applied, two lines of inquiry seem relevant.
First, there is the question of facial overbreadth: will the restrictive covenant operate in
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party audiences have an interest in maximizing their choices
regarding on-air talent. If a competing station in the same market in
which she has been broadcasting hires a newscaster or radio
personality, the very fact of that hire indicates that audience members
want to watch and/or listen to that personality. Enforcing a
noncompete means that the audience will be deprived of a "product"
that they prefer. Enforcing a noncompete also impairs the ability of
other stations in the same broadcast market to compete by
prohibiting the hiring of on-air talent they would like to hire. All
other things being equal, broadcast noncompetes create externalities
in the form of anticompetitive effects by limiting audience choice and
insulating the station from competition in its market area.
The question, then, becomes whether a statutory regime that
allows the enforcement of reasonable noncompetes is likely to be
different in any relevant sense from a regime that does not allow such
noncompetes. That is, the question becomes whether allowing
enforcement of noncompetes is likely to permit the creation of any
value to compensate for the anticompetitive effects that such a regime
engenders.
In some contexts, such as copyright, patent, and trademark, we
accept the anticompetitive effects of granting the creator monopoly
rights in a marketable product because we realize that if initial
investments in product development are not protected, companies
will not make them. Granting temporary monopoly protection to
creators of new products and methodologies actually enlarges, rather
than reduces, customer choice, because it induces firms to invest
optimally in product development.
Most law and economics scholars argue for broad enforcement of
post-employment covenants not to compete on similar grounds."3 If a
firm does not have some assurance that its investment in employee
development and promotion will be protected, it will either be less
inclined to invest in that employee, or will find a way to extract its
development costs from the employee in the form of lower wages or
otherwise. To the extent that broadcast noncompetes encourage
circumstances where no valid business interest of the ex-employer is at stake? Restraints
on postemployment competition that serve no legitimate purpose at the time they are
adopted would be per se invalid. Second, even if the clause is not overbroad per se, it
might still be scrutinized for unreasonableness: are the restrictions so burdensome that
their anticompetitive purposes and effects outweigh their justifications? Restraints that fail
this balancing test might be struck down under a rule of reason.") (citations omitted).
113. For examples, see Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and
the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, forthcoming 76 Ind. L.J. 49, 59-60 & nn. 50-51
(2001), and articles cited therein (draft on file with author).
employer investment in human capital, they probably do not have
anticompetitive effects that would warrant a categorical prohibition
on enforcement.
However, support among academics for broad enforcement of
post-employment noncompetes has been far from universal. Some
commentators have argued that noncompetes do not allow the
creation of extra value that outweighs their anticompetitive effects,
because employers would make the same investments in employees
even if those investments were not protected by noncompetes. For
instance, Professors Gilson and Hyde attribute some of Silicon
Valley's success to the fact that California does not enforce
noncompetes, so that when highly skilled employees move between
firms taking ideas and innovations with them, the rapid diffusion of
information more than compensates for the investment disincentives
that arise when noncompetes are not enforceable." ' A similar
situation exists in the broadcasting industry. ,Notwithstanding
California's refusal to enforce noncompetes, California broadcast
stations continue to develop and promote their on-air talent. If
employers would make the same investment in employee promotion
and training in the absence of a noncompete, allowing a noncompete
does not create any additional value. In that case, the noncompete
imposes anticompetitive costs on society without offering a
countervailing benefit, and should not be enforced.
The potential for anticompetitive effects thus raises two separate
questions pertinent to statutes prohibiting post-employment
covenants not to compete in the broadcasting industry. The first
question is whether post-employment noncompete covenants should
be prohibited in all cases, with a ban on enforcement in the
broadcasting industry merely a first step on the road to a universal
prohibition. The second question, assuming that noncompetes should
be enforceable in at least some cases, is whether there is something
special about the broadcasting industry that makes it a context in
which noncompetes should not be enforced.
Consider the following hypothetical: In Year 1, TrainCo hires
Bing to work for two years at an annual salary of $30,000 and invests
$5,000 in Bing's training."' Bing's marginal product during Year 1
equals $30,000, which is below TrainCo's $35,000 outlay. In Year 2,
114. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575,
608-09 (1999); Alan Hyde, Silicon Valley's High-Velocity Labor Market, 11 J. Applied
Corp. Fin. 28-29 (1998).
115. The hypothetical is taken from Lester, supra n. 113, at 62-63.
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Bing's marginal product rises to $35,000. During the two-year period,
TrainCo has spent $65,000 on salary and training, and Bing's marginal
product has been $65,000. If Bing remains with TrainCo for two
years, TrainCo will recapture its investment in Bing's training, and
extra value will have been created.
TrainCo's problem is that PoachCo is willing to pay $35,000 to
lure Bing away after Year 1. If TrainCo loses Bing at that point, it will
have invested $35,000 and received only $30,000 worth of benefit. A
regular pattern of such poaching, if TrainCo is always on the losing
end, will undermine TrainCo's inducement to invest in training. 6
Suppose, on the other hand, that during Year 1, PoachCo hired
Bob on terms identical to the terms under which TrainCo hired Bing.
Bing and Bob switch companies in Year 2. In that case, each firm has
invested $65,000 in salary and training, and each firm has received
$65,000 worth of benefit, although the individual employees change
places. When all firms are both trainers and poachers, we are less
concerned about systematic underinvestment in training.'
17
The hypothetical implies that noncompetes should be
preferentially enforced in those contexts in which monodirectional
employee poaching - systematic poaching by Firm A at the expense
of Firm B - is likely to present significant disincentives to an
employer's investments in employee development. If we want to
nibble away at the traditional common-law rule allowing enforcement
of noncompetes, the best candidates for a bar on enforcement are
those work environments in which all firms provide comparable levels
of employee training, so that poaching is not likely to be a problem.
How does this principle apply in the broadcast employment
context? The broadcasting industry is characterized by high risks and
high rewards: few employees succeed, but those who do succeed
produce exceptionally high value both for themselves and for the
stations that employ them. The high risk/high reward nature of the
broadcasting industry creates an environment in which poaching is
116. Peter Cappelli, The New Deal at Work: Managing the Market-Driven Workforce
182-87, 199-200 (1999) (providing several examples of companies that reduced their levels
of employee training in response to widespread poaching by competitors); see also
Anthony P. Carnevale & Donna Desrochers, Training in the Dilbert Economy, 53 Training
& Dev. 32 (1999).
117. Of course, the firms will face a classic prisoners' dilemma even in this case. An
individually rational firm has an incentive to avail itself of the training opportunities
provided by other employers, while underinvesting in training so that other firms cannot
free ride on its own efforts. See Laura Dresser & Joel Rogers, Sectoral Strategies of Labor
Market Reform: Emerging Evidence form the U.S., in Vocational and Adult Education In
Europe 269 (Fons van Wieringen ed., 1999).
likely to be a significant problem.
Suppose Station A hires Bing at a salary of $30,000 and invests
$70,000 in advertising and promoting him, for a total expenditure of
$100,000. Station B hires Bob on similar terms. At the end of a year,
Bing is attracting a small audience, and his marginal product is only
$80,000. Bob has high ratings and is now worth $250,000. Station A
has a strong incentive to poach Bob. But Station B does not have a
corollary incentive to poach Bing. All of the poaching will go in one
direction. The poaching opportunity makes the broadcasting industry
an unsuitable context in which to take initial steps towards a
categorical ban on the enforcement of noncompetes. Nor does there
appear to be any reason to suspect that the anticompetitive effects of
noncompetes will be unusually grave in the broadcasting industry.
The risk of anticompetitive effects is not a sufficient justification for a
categorical ban on broadcasting industry covenants not to compete.
B. Market Failure: Systematic Overreaching and Employee Myopia
A second situation in which we may wish to restrict or prohibit
free market trades is when there is reason to suspect market failure,
or to believe that broadcast employees may systematically agree to
noncompetes that are not in their interests.
Systematic overreaching by broadcasting companies may be one
such circumstance. Just as courts refuse to enforce contracts of
adhesion in individual circumstances, it is reasonable for the
legislature to step in collectively wherever a significant power
differential renders the employer capable of imposing a standard
"take it or leave it" contract containing terms to which employees
would not agree if they were capable of bargaining freely over the
terms and conditions of their employment.'18 Systemic overreaching
may be a justification for the legislature to restrict the enforceability
of broadcast noncompetes if two conditions are met. First, there must
be a significant power differential between broadcast stations and
their employees, such that the latter are not able to bargain
effectively over the terms and conditions of their employment." 9
118. See generally Sterk, supra n. 44, at 408-09.
119. Inequality of bargaining power is not, in and of itself, a sufficient justification for
invalidating a contract provision. For further discussion of this issue, see Michael
Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraining of Trade: A Legal and Economic Analysis
135-39 (1986); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 683, 686-88 (1980); William H. White, "Common Callings"
and the Enforcement of Postemployments Covenants in Texas, 19 St. Mary's L.J. 589, 596-
98 (1988).
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Second, there must be some reason to believe that noncompetes are
not in the interest of broadcast employees generally.
The broadcast employee will argue that both conditions are met.
First, with regard to power differentials, broadcast stations generally
have monopsony power in any given market, and the number of
applicants for any given on-air position creates a buyers' market in
hiring on-air talent. Furthermore, argues the employee, there are
numerous reasons for suspecting that broadcast employees will
systemically agree to noncompetes that are not in their interest. Part
of the reason for this is that broadcast employees behave like human
beings, not "homo economicus," and their rationality is bounded in
predictable ways.
One such bound on rationality is employee myopia. People
frequently overemphasize the short term, and discount future gains
and losses in ways that do not maximize their long-term interests.
Under this theory, the employee who is presented with a covenant
not to compete at the beginning of the employment relationship may
disregard or minimize the cost of not being able to work in
broadcasting at some unspecified, future date, and may sign a
noncompete that is not in his long-term interest. The problem is
particularly acute in the broadcasting industry, where the
combination of high unemployment and the chance for high rewards
is such that many applicants will "sell their souls" for a chance at an
on-air position.
Closely related is the tendency of employees to factor out events
that have low probability from their decision making processes.2' A
newscaster who is signing a contract with a broadcast station may
agree to a noncompete because she believes that it is unlikely to ever
have any effect: she expects that either she will remain with the
station for her entire career, or she will leave only when she moves to
a market in a different geographic area. Five or ten years into the
contract, that same newscaster may have developed ties to the local
market such that she is unwilling to move geographically, but may
wish to change her employment to a different station.
Conditions in the broadcasting industry, argues the employee,
are such that the employer has the power to extract virtually any
concession it wants from an employee, who is willing to agree to
120. E.g. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law & Economics: A Progress Report, 1 Am.
L. & Econ. Rev. 115, 122 (1999).
121. Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the
Common Law, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1783, 1801-02 (1996).
anything with little concern for costs the agreement may impose in
the future. Therefore, it is proper for the legislature to impose
mandatory contract terms on the employment relationship.
Upon closer. inspection, however, it is not clear that the
employee's argument has merit. First, with regard to power
differentials, the broadcasting industry is heavily unionized. Most
broadcasting employees are represented by a strong union, such as
AFTRA, that is able to protect their interests. The bargaining
situation resembles bilateral monopoly more closely than a case of a
monopsonist employer dealing with atomistic employees. The union
serves as a check on employee myopia and the employee's tendency
to disregard low-probability events as well.
With regard to the substantive terms of noncompetes, the fact
that the union has not objected to such clauses in collective
bargaining negotiations indicates that broadcast companies are able,
in at least some instances, to offer inducements to enter into
noncompetes that are of greater value to the employee than the right
to market his human capital freely after his contract of employment
has ended. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that many
employees would regard the quid pro quo they receive in the form of
development and promotion as more than adequate compensation for
a temporary limitation on their ability to work in a single market for a
period of time. With a noncompete, the employee can induce the
station to invest optimally in promoting her, and additional value will
be created. The fact of the noncompete means that the employee
must share that additional value with the station.'22 Without a
noncompete, the employee will be free to sell her services anywhere,
but the station will have less incentive to invest in promoting her, and
less value may be created. There is a trade-off between increased
122. Distributional goals, as well as efficiency goals, sometimes dictate the use of
rules of inalienability. Calabresi & Melamed, supra n. 107, at 1114. Although the Coase
theorem predicts that, in the absence of transactions costs, the parties will bargain to
efficient outcomes regardless of the initial assignment of entitlements, the initial
assignment of entitlements directly affects who is richer and who is poorer.
One of the hallmarks of a legal change based on distributional motives is that
the decision maker sees the situation as zero sum: the parties to the transaction are
dividing a pie of fixed size. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in
Contract and Tort Law, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982). The theory underlying the enforcement
of noncompetes, however, is premised on the notion that the existence of the noncompete
enlarges the size of the pie: the noncompete is necessary to protect the employer's
business investments. In that case, the dispute between the parties is not over how to
divide a pie of fixed size, but over how to divide the extra value that was created through
the investments the employer made in reliance on the protection afforded by the
noncompete.
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promotional investment, and the employee's obligation to share the
fruits of that investment with the station that made that investment.
Stated slightly differently, the employee's choice may be between
accepting moderate wages under the noncompete, or being free to
market herself anywhere but having little value to market. An
employee who can induce her radio or television station to invest in
promoting her may be better off in the long run, even if she must
share some of the gains accrued as a result of that promotion.
Remember Bing and Bob in Toledo. When Bing arrives in
Toledo, he is dependent upon the station's investment in him; without
that investment, he cannot do his job. Bing does not consider a year-
long prohibition on working in Toledo to be a significant cost, since
he is willing to move to other markets. Furthermore, even if Bing
ultimately desires to take another job in Toledo with WTOL's
competitor at a higher salary, limiting Bing's ability to switch jobs in
the same market as necessary to protect WTOL's interests does not
strike us as unfair or unconscionable, since WTOL is largely
responsible for creating the value that Bing takes with him to the
competing station. In short, there is no reason to suppose that
broadcasting stations are likely to be guilty of systematic
overreaching in a way that would justify a categorical refusal to
enforce noncompetes.
C. Market Failure: Employee Ignorance
A second possible justification for a categorical prohibition on
noncompetes in the broadcasting industry on grounds of market
failure recognizes that an employee may agree to a contract term not
because he prefers the term, but because he is unaware of its
existence or believes it is not enforceable. One of the most striking
examples of employee ignorance comes from a recent study, which
demonstrated that most workers mistakenly believe the law affords
employees protection against unjust discharge, even when those
workers are presented with contract terms specifying at-will
employment.1 23 Employment lawyers report that many employees sign
noncompete agreements in the mistaken belief that such agreements
are not enforceable.24
However, this is unlikely to be the case in the broadcasting
123. Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers' Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. I11. L. Rev. 447 (1999).
124. Marcia Semmes, Rising Employee Turnover Puts Spotlight on Agreements to
Protect Trade Secrets, 69 U.S.L.W. 2211, 2211 (Oct. 17, 2000).
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industry. Noncompetes have been enforced in a number of high
profile cases, and have garnered sufficient media attention that radio
and television personalities should know that arbitrators and courts
enforce reasonable covenants not to compete.25 Since broadcasting
employees are likely to be aware of the legal ramifications of the
noncompete agreements into which they enter, employee ignorance
does not justify a blanket prohibition on broadcast industry
noncompetes.
D. Fairness Norms
An additional characteristic of human beings, acting in their
capacity as human beings, rather than as "homo economicus," is that
they care about being treated fairly. People are often willing to
sacrifice their material self interest in order to promote outcomes that
they perceive as fair and to punish behavior they perceive as unfair.
26
There are circumstances in which law prohibits voluntary market
transactions, such as usurious lending, price gouging, and ticket
scalping, simply because such transactions are perceived as "unfair.
1 27
Economists criticize these laws as inefficient and anomalous.'
28
Ordinarily, the price of a good is a function of supply and demand:
the market sets the price at the point where the supply equals the
demand. That is not the case with certain goods such as building
supplies immediately after a disaster and Superbowl tickets. In either
case, excess demand for the good creates an opportunity for suppliers
to raise prices far higher than the amount that is actually charged.
Similarly, in the lending context, lenders generally either accept or
reject an application for a loan at a given rate of interest, rather than
approving a loan at a significantly higher interest rate. Professors
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thayer have argued that laws prohibiting
voluntary economic transactions such as usury, price gouging, and
125. See e.g. Dan Trigoboff, WFAA-TV Noncompete Upheld, Broad. & Cable, (Sept.
20, 1999); Bill Carter, NBC and Lou Dobbs Plan Joint Newsletter and Radio Show, N.Y.
Times Abstracts, (Oct. 4, 1999); Dan Trigoboff, Sitting it out in Denver, Broad. & Cable
(March 22, 1999).
126. Human Behavior, supra n. 108, at 10; Behavioral Approach, supra n. 109, at
1489-97; Behavioral Law & Economics, supra n. 120, at 121-22.
127. Behavioral Approach, supra n. 109, at 1510 and statutes cited therein. Laws like
these that restrict purely economic transactions are distinguishable from laws prohibiting
the sale of goods such as babies, body parts, and votes, because (1) transactions such as
lending and selling generally are legal at lower prices, and (2) allowing practices such as
usury, price gouging, and ticket scalping do not impose significant uncompensated costs on
third parties to the economic transaction.
128. Id. at 1511.
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ticket scalping arise because those practices violate our notions of
fairness by imposing terms of trade that depart significantly from the
"reference transaction" - that is, the terms of trade that are ordinarily
applied. 9
Reference to fairness norms may underlie a legislative
prohibition on noncompete agreements, even where those
agreements are economically efficient, if noncompetes are perceived
as unfair. Such covenants not to compete have been attacked on
substantive grounds as a "form of industrial peonage without
redeeming virtue in the American economic order" because they
prevent the employee from working in his chosen profession for a
period of time, and thereby discourage the employee from switching
employers.'30 In the broadcasting industry specifically, radio and
television personalities who oppose the enforcement of noncompetes
claim that it is unfair to give them a forced choice between working
for their original station, leaving the geographic area, or temporarily
leaving the field of broadcasting, particularly if a competing station
has offered them employment on terms significantly better than the
terms in their original contracts.'
Two characteristics of fairness norms are worth noting. First,
where fairness norms are invoked, the salient issue is whether the
challenged transaction is perceived as fair, not whether it actually is
fair, and human actors might not have thought through the
implications of their views.'32 Few supporters of minimum wage
legislation, for instance, have considered the negative effects such
legislation may have on employment levels. Second, fairness norms
are generally determined by reference to the customary terms and
conditions of similar market transactions. Laws restricting market
trades in these contexts often mimic, as much as constrain, the
behavior of the firms they regulate.'33
It is clear that the second of these criteria does not fit in the
129. Id. at 1510-13; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetcsh & Richard Thaler,
Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am. Econ. Rev.
728, 735 (1986).
130. See Jon H. Sylvester, Validity of Post-Employment Non-Compete Covenants in
Broadcast News Employment Contracts, 11 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 423, 449-50
(1989) (quoting Josten's, Inc. v. Cuquet, 383 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. Md. 1974)).
131. Cf. Nigra, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 849 ("WTEN has failed to establish that it is
reasonable or necessary for it to require plaintiff to work for half the salary that other
television stations would pay her, or leave this area where she was raised and her
immediate and extended family still lives, or leave broadcasting.").
132. Behavioral Aproach, supra n. 109, at 1513.
133. Id.
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context of broadcasting noncompetes. Covenants not to compete are
a regular feature of employment contracts in the television news and
radio broadcasting industries. The first criterion - perceived fairness -
may be invoked as propaganda, but it is not clear that perceived
fairness is or should be a proper basis upon which to base a legislative
prohibition on the enforcement of broadcast noncompetes.
Recall that the purpose of legislation invalidating broadcast
noncompetes is to protect employees who enter into noncompete
agreements that are not in their best interests. Recall also that
individuals frequently are willing to sacrifice their self-interest to
avoid outcomes that they perceive as unfair. We have already
established that there is no reason to believe that noncompetes in the
broadcasting industry will categorically operate to the detriment of
on-air talent. Individual performers faced with the prospect of
entering into a noncompete have, to the extent that they are able to
negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, two choices:
either they agree to the noncompete, or they do not.' Individual
performers may perceive noncompete agreements as unfair,
regardless of whether such agreements actually work to their
detriment. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that performers who
are able to do so are at least as likely to refuse to enter into
noncompete agreements that would benefit them, as they are to enter
into noncompete agreements that are not in their best interests. At
the same time, it is beyond cavil that many performers consider
covenants not to compete to be unfair, and enter into them only
because they believe they have no real option to turn them down.
Therefore, an appeal to fairness norms becomes the best justification
thus far for a statutory prohibition on broadcast noncompetes.
E. Reducing Transaction Costs
Neoclassical law and economics posits that since the parties will
bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of
entitlements in the absence of transaction costs, the goal of the legal
system ought to be to minimize transaction costs so that the parties
can bargain to the most efficient outcome. Under the conventional
approach, the legal system should seek the default rule that best
134. Since AFTRA collective bargaining agreements do not categorically prohibit
noncompete agreements, negotiation of noncompetes is left to the individual broadcast
station and performer. Collective bargaining agreements in the entertainment industry are
unusual union contracts in that they set minimum wages and working conditions, but allow
individual bargaining above that floor. Paul C. Weiler, Entertainment, Media, and the Law
754-55 (1997).
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mimics the market, on the ground that the predominant market rule
is the rule that employers and employees consider to be most
efficient. This is particularly true when the industry is heavily
unionized, because the union is better able to protect the interests of
workers as a whole than workers acting individually.
Courts, as discussed above, enforce noncompetes
inconsistently."' A blanket prohibition on covenants not to compete
would provide a clear, predictable rule and save litigation costs.
Such a prohibition would probably not, however, provide the
most efficient outcome. First, a prohibition on noncompetes does not
mimic the market rule, which is posited to be the rule the parties
would generally seek. Second, because a prohibition on noncompetes
provides a mandatory contract term, rather than a default rule around
which the parties can bargain, it is impossible for the market to
correct the rule if the legislature guesses wrong.
Third, issues of institutional competence are raised when a
contract term is imposed by the legislature, rather than by the parties
in their own negotiations. There are at least two ways for AFTRA to
achieve a ban on the enforcement of covenants not to compete in the
broadcast industry: it can lobby fifty state legislatures or it can
negotiate for a ban on noncompetes in its collective bargaining
agreements with employers.'36 The latter option is preferable, for
several reasons. A statutory prohibition creates error costs that a
contract provision does not, since the contract is easier to change
downstream if the prohibition turns out to be unwise. Even if the
prohibition is one we think the contracting parties should want if they
were fully informed, invoking the machinery of the legislative process
to create a statutory ban on noncompetes imposes unnecessary costs
on society to achieve a result that can and should be accomplished
less expensively through private contract negotiations. The resulting
legislation becomes a single exception to a general rule allowing the
enforcement of post-employment noncompetes that cannot be
135. See supra Parts II & III.
136. AFTRA enters into separate collective bargaining agreements with individual
stations, but its agreements with network affiliates are standard. See e.g. National Code of
Fair Practice for Network Television Broadcasting (1994-1997). Multiemployer bargaining
is also common. An examination of AFIRA's website indicates that slightly over 35% of
its contracts are with ABC, CBS, or NBC affiliates. The vast majority of the stations with
which AFTRA has contracts are affiliated with one of a dozen entities: the three major
networks, A.H. Belo, AMFM, Inc., Chris Craft, Clear Channel, Cox Broadcasting, Fox,
Gannett, Hearst/Argyle, and Westwood One. <http://www.aftra.com> (accessed Nov. 8,
2000). As a practical matter, AFTRA's contracts with those dozen entities will set the
standard for the industry.
justified on any principled basis. In addition, exposing a prohibition
on noncompetes to the collective bargaining process makes the
tradeoffs associated with such a prohibition patent, and allows the
affected parties to tailor the terms of such a prohibition to achieve a
result that they themselves want, rather than a result the legislature
sees fit to impose on them.137 Negotiating noncompetes through the
collective bargaining process, rather than imposing them by
legislative fiat, is less costly, produces a more coherent statutory
scheme, and gives stations and on-air talent the freedom to design a
rule that suits their needs. In short, imposing a statutory prohibition
on covenants not to compete in the broadcasting industry does not
appear to be a good way to minimize transactions costs and smooth
the way to an efficient outcome for broadcast stations and employees.
V
Conclusion
Covenants not to compete in the broadcasting industry serve the
purpose of encouraging optimal levels of employer investment in
developing and promoting on-air talent by providing the employer
with assurances that their investments will not be lost to competing
stations after the employee's term of employment has ended. To the
extent that such covenants encourage increased investment in
broadcast personnel, they create extra value that can be shared
between the station and the employee. At the same time, those
covenants restrict the alienation of human capital and reduce
competition.
In recent years, state legislatures have begun to curtail the
enforceability of covenants not to compete in the broadcasting
industry, notwithstanding the fact that such covenants are enforceable
in other industries to the extent that they are reasonable. I have
argued that no principled reason exists to treat the broadcasting
industry differently from other industries with respect to the
enforceability of covenants not to compete. The industry is not
characterized by systematic overreaching on the part of employers.
There is no reason to suppose that on-air personalities misunderstand
their rights and sign noncompetes in the mistaken belief that they are
137. A number of possibilities come to mind. The broadcasters and the union could
agree to allow noncompetes only for highly compensated on-air talent; they could agree to
limit the duration of noncompetes to three or six months; they could require stations to
match competitors' offers before invoking a noncompete; and/or they could establish fee
schedules that would allow employees to "buy out" their noncompetes if they move to
competing stations.
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not enforceable. There is no reason to suppose that allowing
noncompetes disserves employee interests in the long run. No
significant uncompensated costs are imposed on third parties. To the
extent that current market practices are an indicator, it appears that a
prohibition on noncompetes is not the outcome that broadcast
stations and employees would choose if they were allowed freely to
negotiate their own contracts. Furthermore, broadcasting is heavily
unionized, and AFTRA is capable of representing its members'
interests.
Allowing the parties to freely negotiate whether, and to what
extent, covenants not to compete will be enforced in the context of
collective bargaining negotiations has several advantages over a
legislative solution. The contract approach is more flexible to develop
and administer, can be tailored to fit the parties' needs, and imposes
fewer error costs. For these reasons, I believe that a statutory
prohibition on covenants not to compete in the broadcast industry is
an unwise policy choice. The entities that employ and represent
television newscasters and radio personalities would produce better
results if they concentrated their efforts on negotiating a sensible
treatment of noncompetes in the collective bargaining agreements
that govern their relations.
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